De très nombreux Canadiens qui vivent dans des immeubles d'appartements ou de condominiums n'ont pas accès à des signaux de prix de l'énergie. Pour encourager l'économie d'énergie, certains gouvernements explorent donc actuellement la possibilité d'imposer le comptage obligatoire dans chaque unité d'habitation. Dans cette étude, nous montrons que l'installation de compteurs divisionnaires dans un immeuble de condominiums de Toronto a permis de réduire de 20 % la consommation d'électricité. Toutefois, les coûts qu'engendre cette opération (le comptage et le service à la clientèle) dépassent largement l'économie ainsi réalisée, et les avantages nets privés sont donc minimes ou nuls. Les avantages nets publics, pour leur part, dépendent fortement de la valeur des externalités liées à la production d'électricité. Dans le cas que nous avons étudié, nous évaluons ces avantages à environ 5 %, ce qui est loin des 20 % de réduction de la consommation d'électricité ; de plus, nous avançons qu'ils pourraient être négatifs pour plusieurs immeubles.
introduCtion T wenty-six percent of Ontario residents live in multi-unit buildings and between 75 to 90 percent of these buildings use bulk metering in which a single meter measures all electricity use (Statistics Canada 2009) . 1 Together, this implies that approximately one-fifth of Ontario's residential electricity consumers are effectively insulated from price signals, paying only indirectly a fixed share of total building costs. These facts, coupled with growing public demand for energy conservation, have motivated calls for individual suite metering of multiple-unit residential apartment and condominium buildings. In fact, the largest Canadian province has recently enacted legislation empowering regulators to require the installation of such meters. 2 This is in addition to regulations proclaimed in 2007 requiring suite metering in all new condominium buildings. 3 The recent rollout of smart metering in British Columbia, at a cost of nearly $1 billion, while not currently covering multi-unit buildings, suggests that other Canadian jurisdictions may follow Ontario's lead. 4 Moreover, proposals to encourage sub-metering have met with stiff resistance from tenants' organizations in rental buildings. 5 Clearly, the individual metering of multi-unit residential buildings is a growing public policy issue.
While the logic behind such policies is appealing, the full social costs and benefits are unknown. Previous research focused on the price elasticity of residential electricity demand and consistently finds that sub-metering reduces consumption by 15 to 25 percent. One can extrapolate a rough estimate of the net benefits of metering from these estimates. To illustrate, consider a typical condominium unit that consumes 1,800 kWh of electricity monthly. 6 A 20 percent reduction in electricity consumption will save 360 kWh. If the average wholesale electricity price in Ontario reflects marginal production costs, then one may value this reduction in consumption at $0.04/kWh or $14.40 per month. Ignoring the lost consumer surplus from the now lower consumption, the net benefits of metering may be close to nil if the installation and ongoing monitoring costs approach $14 per month-which is not unlikely. 7 If we incorporate reasonable estimates of the lost consumer surplus, the net gain from individual metering may easily be negative.
In this paper, we estimate the net benefits of sub-metering and examine the heterogeneity of benefits across individual suites within a building. Moreover, we collect finer data, on more variables, over a longer span of time than typical studies in this area. Specifically, we analyze six years of pre-sub-metering data and 19 months of postsub-metering data for a residential condominium building in Toronto, Ontario. Our sample building, with all-electric heating, air conditioning, and hot water, should yield maximum net benefits of sub-metering. 8 Other buildings will yield lower, perhaps negative, net benefits. Most importantly, we carefully compare total costs before and after submetering, including all metering and billing costs.
Our results suggest that the social benefits of metering, while positive, are far smaller than headline conservation numbers suggest. The net benefits depend on many factors including the design of the building, the fixed costs of serving individual customers, and the value assigned to externalities from electricity generation. In addition, we find large variation across suites in electricity consumption after sub-metering, only some of which is explained by unit characteristics. For many residents, the private net benefits are negative. The limited benefits that we find should raise caution flags for enthusiasts of universal sub-metering.
Previous literature
Researchers have studied the price elasticity of residential electricity demand for decades. We highlight some key results from this literature in Table 1 . These studies examine small and large price changes but do not examine prices of zero. Yet for residents of a bulk-metered apartment or condominium building
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One of the few refereed studies of the effects of sub-metering is Munley, Taylor, and Formby (1990) . They study a garden apartment complex in Washington DC in which 44 apartments were sub-metered in August 1979 but only 22 units were charged explicitly for their own consumption. Each unit's electricity provided heating and cooling for the unit, but domestic hot water was centrally provided. The consumption of all units was measured during the 12 months prior to sub-metering and five months afterward. The authors conclude that there are substantial net benefits from sub-metering when metering and billing costs are ignored.
More recently, Levinson and Neimann (2004) investigate the energy consumption response of apartment tenants when landlords pay utility bills, and tenant willingness to pay for such inclusive contracts. Their study is not limited to electricity usage, and considers all sources of heat from natural gas, electricity, fuel oil, or propane furnaces. They find that rents are higher with inclusive contracts but not sufficiently higher to offset the increased cost of energy use. Unfortunately, as is typically the case in this literature, their analysis faces serious data limitations. Levinson and Neimann use data from the Residential Energy Consumption Survey and must impute fuel usage from winter indoor temperature settings. They find that the indoor temperature setting is set approximately 0.75˚F higher when utilities are included in the rent. By contrast, our data-described in the following section-contain uniquely detailed, precise data on the amount of electricity consumed by each unit in our sample building, as each unit has an individual electronically reporting smart meter.
Studies by consultants or government departments focus on the reduction in electricity consumption arising from sub-metering. The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (2001) reports on six buildings in New York City that were sub-metered in the 1980s and 1990s. Three residential buildings were monitored for usage in 1986 and then sub-metered in the early and mid-1990s. 9 Building electricity consumption dropped 12 percent, 19 percent, and 20 percent in 1990-91, and in the mid-1990s the reductions (compared to 1986) were little changed at 15 percent, 17 percent, and 19 percent. The cost savings were said to be similar to the electricity reductions, but no metering or cost data are reported (NYSERDA 2001, 17) . Seventy-three percent of residents paid less after sub-metering than before because of their reduced consumption (NYSERDA 2001, A1-2 ). Another set of three buildings that were sub-metered in 1993-94 and analyzed in 1995-96 showed reductions in consumption of 17 percent, 14 percent, and 10 percent with cost savings of the same magnitude (NYSERDA 2001, 18) . The price of electricity is not identified and the methodology is not described, but the study appears to have corrected for temperature. Metering and billing costs are not mentioned.
Most relevant to Canada is the Oakville Pilot Study in which three condominium buildings were converted from bulk metering to tiered prices (the Ontario Regulated Price Plan) and then to time-ofuse prices, all during 2006. A regression model using heating degree days (HDD), cooling degree days (CDD), and time as explanatory variables was used to estimate that the two buildings in which tiered prices were in place for at least four months experienced reductions in consumption of 18 percent and 25 percent. The data spanned about seven years, but the post-sub-metering time was less than a year. In all cases, there was little reduction in common area consumption; the savings were concentrated in the occupied units (Navigant 2008). Companies offering sub-metering report reduced electricity consumption of 20-30 percent mostly from behavioural changes (Ontario Standing Committee on Justice Policy 2006; Stratacon 2010). Young and Maruejols (2009) report that electricity consumption is much higher in apartments where the landlord pays the electricity bills than where the tenant pays.
These studies suggest that sub-metering should reduce electricity consumption by 15 to 25 percent, but it is not clear whether savings will outweigh the increased metering and billing costs. We add to this previous research by collecting and utilizing additional data. We analyze six years of pre-sub-metering data and 19 months of post-sub-metering data. The New York studies relied on one year of pre-submetering data and two years of post-sub-metering, while the Oakville pilot used only two, four, and ten months of tiered prices post-sub-metering in the three buildings. Most importantly, we carefully compare total costs before and after sub-metering, including all metering and billing costs.
data
Our study building is a luxury condominium in Toronto, Ontario, built in the 1970s with 40 units on three levels, some of them occupying multiple floors. The building has large, separately wired units, with electric heat, hot water, laundry appliances, stove, and air conditioning in each unit. This is the ideal building for maximizing the effect of sub-metering. In this building the owners debated the merits of sub-metering before it was contracted, and so they were aware of the change before the Table 3 . Our preferred specification is (4), with an R 2 of 0.97 suggesting that time-of-year and climatic variation are the predominant predictors of aggregate electricity consumption. Specifically, 100 more CDDs or HDDs in a typical month increase electricity consumption by 13 percent. Most importantly, the first line shows that sub-metering reduced consumption by 20 percent. The results are reasonably robust; specifications (2), (3), and (4b) do not change the sub-metering dummy significantly.
Might some of this decrease be attributable to increases in electricity prices during the study period or to the economic recession that began in 2008? Because unit owners paid for only a share of total utility costs before sub-metering, there is no reason to believe that they would have responded to price changes during that time. Average residential Source: Authors' compilation based on data from the study building, the metering supplier, and unit owners.
consumption per residential unit did decline in Toronto at about 1 percent per year during the decade of the 2000s, including a drop of about 6 percent between 2006-2007 and 2009 , but this will have been driven in part by owners of single-family residences responding to price increases and in part by the construction of ever smaller condominium units which lowered the average consumption per residence. The efficiency of new electrical appliances improved during this time, but there was no improvement in the efficiency of electric resistance heating, the largest load, and few of the air conditioning units or water heaters were replaced. Finally, the owners in this building have high incomes and many are retired, and therefore they are largely insulated from the risk of lost income arising from the recession. If any of these external factors did reduce consumption in this building over the study period, the net benefits of sub-metering will be even smaller than we estimate. 10
Less Conservation in Winter
To examine the timing of the response to sub-metering, we use equation (1) to predict postsub-metering consumption. We plot the deviation between actual and predicted consumption in Table 3 Aggregate Impact of Sub-Metering ***p < 1 percent. **p < 5 percent. *p < 10 percent.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Canadian PubliC PoliCy -analyse de Politiques, vol. xxxvii, no. 4 2011 If we divide the year into two seasons, with summer running from May through October, the savings average 11 percent in the winter and 21 percent in the summer. 11 This is consistent with the findings of Archibald, Finifter, and Moody (1982) , who report summer elasticities almost twice as great as winter elasticity. Looking across the months we find that conservation is greatest in spring and summer, modest in fall, and least in winter. This is consistent with the hypothesis that much of the conservation was achieved by less intensive use of electric appliances and lights. The modest midwinter conservation may reflect the reluctance of these residents to sacrifice much comfort in the middle of the Canadian winter.
Cost-benefit analysis
We approach the cost-benefit analysis of submetering for this building in three different ways. First, we estimate the private costs and benefits for the condominium owners as a group, comparing what they paid post-sub-metering with an estimate of what they would have paid if sub-metering had
Figure 1
Post-Sub-Metering Actual Relative to Predicted Consumption
Note: This figure plots the percentage deviation between the actual electricity consumption and the predicted level. Prediction is based on a regression specification of equation (1) not occurred. Second, we calculate social costs and benefits using the regulated electricity price to represent the value of the electricity saved. Third, we repeat the social cost-benefit analysis using other measures of the value of the saved electricity.
Evaluating the private net benefits of submetering for the condo owners requires an estimate of the value of the electricity conserved less the costs associated with that conservation. On the benefit side, we value the electricity saved at the consumer price. This implies that benefits B equal the product of saved electricity ΔQ and the consumer price per unit P, which is the sum of the commodity price and the variable delivery charge. On the cost side there are increased fixed delivery charges ΔF, which we assume represent a real resource cost of sub-metering, and any lost consumer surplus (ΔCS). If demand is linear, the standard calculation of lost consumer surplus is ΔCS = PΔQ. Thus net benefits are
We use our regression results from equation (1) and Table 3 to forecast the monthly savings in building consumption, which we multiply by the monthly commodity price. The delivery costs are more elusive because if bulk metering had continued, the residents would have paid delivery charges based on the building peak consumption for any hour during the billing month. We do not know the building monthly peak post-sub-metering. Instead, we estimated the relationship between monthly kilowatt-hour consumption and the delivery charges, both before and after submetering. The results are presented in Table 4 . The building's variable delivery charges are similar before and after sub-metering: 2.87 cents/kWh and 2.95 cents/kWh. We use 2.9 cents to represent the delivery charge saving attributed to the reduction in consumption in each month. The intercept in the regression represents fixed monthly delivery costs, which have increased from $345 (statistically insignificant) to $1,206 per month; these costs include the monthly "customer charge" of $12.55 and a positive intercept of approximately $17 per month/unit for the variable charge. Over a year this represents an increase of $10,332, about 7 percent of annual electricity costs. Notes: Results from two regressions of building-wide electricity delivery charges on usage before and after sub-metering. Standard errors in brackets. a The marginal cost corresponds to the slope coefficient in each regression. This result suggests that marginal costs of usage and delivery changed little after metering. b The fixed cost can represent the total of explicit administrative fixed costs (which are over $500 per year) and changes in peak pricing. This result suggests that fixed costs increased. ***p < 1 percent. **p < 5 percent. *p < 10 percent.
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Net first-year private cash savings are $7,957 or 5.6 percent, a substantial reward for the 20 percent reduction in consumption.
The lost consumer surplus calculation requires further consideration. We consider four scenarios: High: the loss from a perfectly elastic demand at the new price, ΔCS = PΔQ; Medium: the standard loss from moving up a straight-line demand curve from zero price, ΔCS = PΔQ; Low: half the standard loss, ΔCS = PΔQ; and None: no lost consumer surplus, ΔCS = 0. We assume the price that residents respond to is the sum of marginal charges for consumption and distribution. Our preferred scenario is Low since this reflects plausible opportunities for some conservation without any loss of utility, such as lower temperature when tenants are not in the unit in winter. 12 Before sub-metering the electricity price to individual units was virtually zero, and we believe there may be careless use of lights and appliances in such circumstances, allowing some conservation with little or no loss of utility. The Low Scenario implies a loss of $4,572 (ΔCS = PΔQ), which yields a net benefit of $3,385 (NB = PΔQ -ΔF). We provide details for each scenario in Table 5 . Remarkably, despite the 20 percent reduction in electricity consumption in this building, the owners have only modestly improved their welfare in aggregate because the electricity savings are largely offset by increased delivery costs and by the disutility arising from conservation.
Social cost-benefit analysis requires consideration of three further issues: whether part of the delivery charges represents economic rents rather than resource costs; whether the regulated price represents marginal generation costs; and what adjustment must be made for the environmental costs of generation. With respect to the first issue, we have no cost study for this supplier, and so we Any electricity distributor may offer suite metering within its territory. Toronto Hydro offers this service, charging the same rates that it charges to residential customers. In addition, 19 firms are licensed to offer sub-metering services in Ontario (OEB 2010a) and, according to their websites, eight are actively engaged in this service. Seven of these active firms are members of a Smart SubMetering Working Group that represents their interests at regulatory hearings (OEB 2010b, 25) . This is a reasonably competitive structure, and the excess of licences over active providers suggests that entry could occur easily. The OEB has found that the market is in fact competitive (OEB 2010b, 25) . The pricing for these services, however, is not always transparent. Some sub-metering firms charge a fixed monthly cost per customer plus a variable fee based on peak demand. Rates are not published but must be negotiated by the customer, and building boards will not be able to estimate the monthly cost of the fees without expert advice. A building board might secure two or three competing bids but unless the firms have the same price structure, it will be difficult for the board to compare price levels. Moreover, contract periods may extend to 25 years with the metering company having the right to change its rates subject to approval by the OEB.
The complexity of pricing means that we cannot assume that customers are well informed. This gives the firms some degree of market power. On the other hand, the Smart Sub-Metering Working Group has accused the distribution firms of crosssubsidizing their suite metering rates (OEB 2010b, 25-30) , which would limit the amount that the submetering firms could charge. The OEB has ordered a cost allocation study to determine whether Toronto Hydro is cross-subsidizing its suite metering rates, and this study should help establish the real costs of suite and sub-metering. In the meantime, we assume that the market is sufficiently competitive that the distribution charges represent real resource costs.
Social cost-benefit analysis must also recognize that the regulated tiered electricity price may not represent time-varying short-run marginal costs. We provide three alternative estimates to reflect marginal costs of generation, environmental externalities, and displacing wind power paid for by Ontario's Feed-In Tariff. We use a more general equation for net benefits:
where V represents the per unit social value of the conserved electricity. Note that lost consumer surplus still depends on the price paid, not the social value, and reflects our Low Scenario.
The marginal cost of electricity generation varies depending on the supply and demand for electricity, rising and falling by season, day, and hour. Ontario's wholesale electricity market generates hourly prices, the Hourly Ontario Electricity Price (HOEP), which approximate the marginal cost of generation. If we ignore air pollution arising from electricity generation, we could use the average monthly wholesale price to approximate the social value of the conservation savings. These short-run prices are significantly lower than the regulated consumer prices post-sub-metering during our study period in part because sub-metering coincided with the recession that started in 2008. The recession reduced electricity demand, which in turn
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When the economy recovers, the marginal cost (MC) should rise to the regulated price or more, causing social savings to reach or exceed private savings. Clearly any analysis of the social benefits of sub-metering needs to consider the time variation in local electricity marginal generation costs and the time pattern of conservation. We have not seen this analysis in any other paper. Because the low MC during our study period is transitory, we calculate the benefits based both on the short-term MC and on the regulated price, which is closer to (but probably below) the MC over a range of economic conditions. Another alternative valuation of electricity conservation recognizes that the price of electricity fails to include costs such as air pollution damage from fossil-fuelled plants and greenhouse gas emissions from those plants. These externalities could represent from 1 cent to 10 cents/kWh depending on the type of fossil generation and the assumed value of CO2 (see Appendix B). In Ontario where demand reduction may reduce either coal-fired or gas-fired generation, we assume a low value of 2 cents/kWh and a high value of 8 cents/kWh. These values would increase the net benefits of conservation by approximately $4,000 and $16,000 per year, respectively. (See Appendix B for explanation and calculation.) Including environmental considerations substantially increases the economic desirability of electricity conservation, yielding positive net benefits for our building of 5 percent and 14 percent of baseline electricity costs. Indeed, it is environmental considerations that motivate many electricity conservation programs including sub-metering. Table  6 summarizes these results. If Ontario succeeds in closing its coal plants as planned in 2014, only the low externality value will be relevant. Another way to view the environmental consequences of this conservation is to assume that the government is choosing between contracting for more costly green power under the Green Energy Act 13 versus sub-metering in buildings like this one. The Feed-In Tariff offers 13.5 cents for landbased wind farms and much more for other forms of "green" energy. If we value the saved electricity at $0.135/kWh rather than the regulated price, the net social benefits from sub-metering are over $18,000 or nearly 13 percent of annual spending. Sub-metering is very attractive if we assume a high value for the environmental benefits of the resulting electricity conservation.
To generalize these results for other buildings, consider a simple exercise. Assume that submetering reduces electricity consumption by 20 percent, as in our building, and that the prices of electricity and distribution are the same as in our building. The fixed costs of sub-metering mean that as consumption drops for smaller or less electricity-intensive buildings, the net benefits will diminish. We can calculate the baseline electricity consumption that would be needed to yield a social break-even by setting equation (3) equal to zero and solving for ΔQ. Table 7 shows the baseline annual consumption that yields zero net benefits for each of our valuation scenarios. Serious consideration of the environmental externalities can lead to break-even for a building where typical units consume slightly less than half as much electricity as a typical unit in our sample building. Thus, buildings where heat and hot water are not electrically powered are not prime candidates for sub-metering.
These results in Table 7 suggest a limited scope for electricity sub-metering benefits in many buildings that are not intensive electricity consumers. Recall that the price elasticity of electricity consumption in a building with electric heat, hot water, and air conditioning is an order of magnitude larger than in buildings without (Reiss and White 2005) . One can expect, therefore, a building without these Displacing wind power at 13.5 cents/kWh 143 8.0
Notes: This illustrates the minimum amount of consumption per suite required to achieve break-even social net benefits, based on our analysis and the Low Scenario for lost consumer surplus. HOEP = Hourly Ontario Electricity Price. a Break-even kilowatt-hour consumption is calculated as the root of equation (3), with fixed costs of sub-metering equal to $21.53 ($10,332/year for our building, divided by 40 units and 12 months). b Conservation needed to break even as percentage of usage for an average Canadian apartment suite built after 1981 of 1,800 kWh (CMHC 2001, 2) . For example, assuming low pollution externalities in valuing conserved electricity, sub-metering would need to decrease consumption by 12.3 percent in order to break even.
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individual unit-level analysis Moving away from building-level aggregates, we turn to an important and often overlooked aspect of electricity sub-metering: unit-level heterogeneity of costs and benefits. To the extent that regulatory discussions now underway in various provinces are influenced by political-economy considerations, knowing the extent of tenants facing significant cost increases from metering is important as they are likely to object. Our data for this analysis are composed of individual monthly bill data, disaggregated by category (distribution, taxes, commodity charges, etc.), and unit characteristics (detailed below). The response rate for this portion of our analysis was high: only two units out of 40 declined permission. The units in this building are heterogeneous, and residents were eager to know if their electricity bills were "fair." 14 We developed a model to capture the consumption of individual units as a function of physical characteristics including heated floor space, exterior wall exposure, balcony type, and floor location. We performed a statistical analysis on the post-sub-metering monthly consumption data for the individual units that provided access to their data. Because the aggregate analysis indicated substantial differences in conservation between summer (May-October) and winter (November-April), we analyzed the two seasons separately, and of course we included HDD or CDD in the equations. The post-metering unit cross-section specification is given by (4) where X i is a vector of individual unit characteristics: square footage; exterior wall exposure length; balcony type (enclosed, or fully open); building floor level; direction of exposure (north, south, etc.); vacancy (vacations, for instance); and tenancy status (owner or tenant occupied). CDD t is included only during the summer months. The results are presented in Table 8 .
We interpret these results as follows. Our unit characteristics explain almost 75 percent of winter consumption but less than 40 percent of summer consumption. Heating degree-days are a significant determinant of electricity consumption in winter, and cooling degree-days have some effect on electricity consumption in summer. Units with 10 percent greater exterior wall exposure use approximately 61 kWh more electricity per month in the winter, but exterior exposure has no significant effect in the summer. Units with 10 percent greater interior heated area use approximately 139 kWh more electricity per month in the winter and approximately 84 kWh more in the summer. The top-level units use 222 kWh/month (13 percent) less electricity in the summer than the ground-level units after adjusting for floor space and exterior area. A vacant unit uses 887 kWh/month less electricity in winter than an occupied unit, a saving of 34 percent. The summer saving from vacancy is nearly 600 kWh/month, almost 40 percent of monthly summer usage.
We explore the "lifestyle" variation further by using equation (4) to predict the average monthly consumption of each unit post-sub-metering and by comparing this with actual average monthly consumption. Figure  2 shows the density distribution of these deviations. Most units consume electricity within +/-30 percent of the predicted amount. Three units, however, use 50 percent to 60 percent less electricity than our model predicts. Five units use over 40 percent more electricity than our model predicts. Either there are substantial lifestyle differences among these unit owners or there are features of their units that impact electricity consumption in a major way that is not captured in our unit characteristics. ***p < 1 percent. **p < 5 percent. *p < 10 percent.
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Customer PerCePtion of sub-metering's finanCial effeCts
The introduction of sub-metering changed electricity costs for unit owners in three ways. First, the unit owner now pays for his or her actual electricity consumption rather than paying for a share of the total building consumption allocated by a formula based on floor area. Even if there were no behavioural response, most unit owners' bills would change since actual consumption differs from their fixed share. Second, unit owners could-and did-save money with submetering by reducing their electricity consumption. Third, sub-metering introduced new bill elements and calculations for unit owners. The owners pay the same price per kilowatt-hour for electricity as the entire building paid previously. After sub-metering, however, each owner pays a delivery charge while previously there was a single delivery charge for the entire building. The fixed portion of the delivery charge adds $12.55 to the monthly cost for each unit owner. In addition, delivery charges include a price multiplied by the sum of their individual peak hourly demands (kW) for each day of the month, which has a positive intercept. Previously the building paid a demand charge based on the building's peak hourly demand at any time during the month. In the CostBenefit Analysis section, we determined that delivery costs have increased substantially, adding $10,332 per year to the previous delivery cost for the building. The owners instinctively compare their costs after sub-metering with the corresponding cost for recent years, without adjusting for weather or price changes. While this is not economically relevant, it does predict how they will perceive the sub-metering project. A simple comparison of before-and-after costs measures whether the owners will be happy or unhappy with the change. The average annual cost of electricity for the building for the three years prior to sub-metering was $142,443, excluding GST. The sum of the common and unit costs in the first 12 months post-sub-metering was $141,483, excluding GST. The simple savings are $960 or 0.67 percent, not enough to generate enthusiasm among the owners. We do not know how much electricity each individual unit consumed prior to sub-metering. However, we can compare the actual costs post-sub-metering with the amounts that unit owners paid for electricity through their condominium fees prior to sub-metering. We took the average annual electricity cost for the building in [2005] [2006] [2007] and allocated it to individual units according to the condominium allocation formula. We added to the actual bill amounts from April 2008 through March 2009 the share of the common cost for the same period based on the allocation formula. Subtracting the post-sub-metering costs from the allocated presub-metering cost compares the costs that owners actually experience. 
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Canadian PubliC PoliCy -analyse de Politiques, vol. xxxvii, no. 4 2011 increased delivery charges. However, almost half of the owners paid more with sub-metering than they paid under the allocation formula, and some are paying substantially more. While overall gains exceeded overall losses, the losers expressed their dismay much more vigorously than any satisfaction expressed by the winners. 15 If this is a typical reaction, it helps to explain why building boards may be reluctant to undertake sub-metering projects and why legislatures might be reluctant to mandate them. Sub-metering will have to be sold on the basis of environmental benefits, not on private cost savings.
ConClusions and imPliCations
This study confirms that installing meters so that residents pay for their own electricity can achieve large reductions in electricity use in an all-electric building where the utilities for each unit can be privately metered. Annual electricity consumption was reduced by 20 percent. The reduction was greater in the summer than in the winter. The reduction was immediate, beginning with the first month of metering, suggesting that it was achieved mostly with behavioural changes. Both the magnitude of the conservation and its immediacy are consistent with industry statements about past experience. This, however, is the end of the good news. The electricity savings were substantially offset by increased delivery charges for each unit in the building to cover metering and billing costs. Assessing sub-metering requires careful analysis of these charges. The 20 percent reduction yielded net financial savings in our building of only 5.5 percent. Moreover if the conservation involves lost utility, deducting only half of a standard calculation of lost consumer surplus leaves only modest increases in welfare for our owners. Deducting the standard calculation of consumer surplus leaves them worse off in aggregate than before sub-metering.
Our findings parallel other studies in showing considerable variations in financial consequences among owners in the building. Owners whose consumption is more than their proportion of floor space in the building may pay more after metering than before even if they engage in some conservation. We find that basic unit characteristics allow us to predict relative unit consumption with reasonable accuracy. Some, however, consume 50 percent less than our model predicts and a few consume 50 percent more, suggesting that individual lifestyles and/or some unobserved characteristics substantially affect consumption.
The timing of this metering project coincided with an economic slowdown that reduced marginal generation costs but not the regulated electricity price. If we value savings according to marginal costs, revealed by the wholesale electricity price, social savings are much less than 20 percent and net benefits were insignificant. On the other hand, the sub-metering project could have occurred when demand was high relative to supply in which case social savings would exceed those calculated at the regulated price. When analyzing a specific project, one should use marginal generation cost, if it is available.
Social benefit cost analysis should also consider the reduction in air pollution and greenhouse gas damage arising from the electricity savings. These unpriced externalities motivate much of today's interest in energy conservation and can add substantially to the benefits of sub-metering, giving rise to net social benefits for this building ranging from 5 percent to almost 14 percent of pre-sub-metering costs, much greater than the net private benefits. Substituting for expensive green power also yields large net social benefits. A social benefit cost analysis that ignores the value of the environmental improvement from reduced consumption may be seriously misleading. Once again, our failure to price environmental externalities through cap-andtrade or effluent charges complicates other public policy decisions. This building configuration is ideal for sub-metering because it is all-electric and it has relatively large units. A similar but smaller building might still yield positive net social benefits, but only if we consider environmental externalities in a jurisdiction with coal on the margin, even if baseline consumption is below 100,000 kWh/yr. Intuition and past studies lead us to expect energy conservation to be smaller in buildings with central heating or central air conditioning or central hot water supply. Rental apartment buildings would present different problems in the longer run because sub-metering would attenuate the landlord's interest in installing energy-efficient appliances, windows and other energy-saving features. Further analysis would be needed to determine whether the social costs of sub-metering exceed the benefits in those buildings.
Overall, this study suggests that electricity submetering will pass a social cost-benefit test for only a fraction of multiple-unit residential buildings, particularly all-electric condominium buildings. The fraction will be higher in a jurisdiction where a high value is assigned to pollution and greenhouse gas reductions and where coal-fired electricity is likely to be reduced by energy conservation. Because savings are greater in the summer, a warmer climate should yield better cost-benefit results. In many cases, the private financial impact on the residents may be negative until such time as pollution taxes or cap-and-trade pollution and greenhouse gas control regimes raise the price of electricity to fully reflect the externalities caused by generation.
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The reported aggregate monthly consumption data for 1995 -1998 , 2001 -2003 , and 2005 -March 2008 display clear signs of measurement error. There are numerous months with implausible levels of electricity usage (negative or close to zero in winter months, for instance). This is due to the estimation procedure used by the electrical provider in a month when the meter is not read. When the meter is read subsequently, that later month is assigned an amount that leads to the correct total for the estimated months, but if the first month was too high the next month will be too low or vice versa. To generate a series that better reflects the actual consumption for each month, we use a statistical smoothing technique.
Outlier months are identified and their consumption is partially deleted from the data. Reported consumption that is very big, very small, or very different from the average for that month of the year is not used to estimate the first-round smoothed values. The definition for big/small/different is as follows: (1) the top and bottom 5 percent of reported monthly usages and (2) the top and bottom 5 percent of usage for months that deviate from the unconditional average usage for that given month over the years for which we have data. The questionable data flagged under the first criterion are a subset of those flagged by the second, with the addition of January 2005 and June 2002. We then replace the deleted values with the average for that month in all other years. However, we do not ignore the questionable values. We save them and add back in the difference between the questionable value and the replacement value, spread over all months in a data series (e.g., 1995-98) in proportion to the first round of smoothed values. In this way, the total electricity consumption for each data series is the same for the original data and the smoothed data. Visual inspection suggests that the smoothed data are a reasonable representation of the raw data (see Figure A1 ). We tested to see whether the results are affected by the application of the first criterion and found that the estimated effect of sub-metering is about 20 percent lower without applying the first criterion in the smoothing process. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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The environmental benefit from reducing electricity generation depends on which types of generation units reduce their output. In Ontario the nuclear units and hydroelectric units have high capital costs and low operating costs, and so their output is not reduced as demand falls. Wind generation is accepted on the grid as it is available. Reduced demand thus will generally reduce coal-or gas-fired generation. Since Ontario has committed to eliminating coal generation as soon as possible and no later than 2014, it is likely that general electricity conservation reduced coal generation during our study period. Dewees (2008, Table 3 ) concludes that the social cost of air pollution from coal-fired plants in five states close to the Great Lakes is $32.81/MWh considering harm occurring in the airshed of those states and Ontario. A recent study for the US National Academy of Sciences concluded that the average externality from the emission of criteria pollutants from coal-fired power plants in the US was 3.2 cents/kWh, equal to $32/MWh (US National Research Council 2009, 6 ). The population density of southern Ontario is sufficiently similar to that of much of the US to offer some confirmation that the best estimate for the cost of traditional air pollution is in the low $30s. To this we must add the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Many analysts believe that significant reductions in GHG emissions will require a price on CO2 of $20 or $50 or even $80/tonne (Jaccard 2007, 23) , which would give rise to total environmental costs in the range of $55-100/MWh.
If Ontario does close its last coal plant in 2014, the marginal generation will be natural gas. Because natural gas generation releases much less pollution than coal, the social cost of the non-GHG emissions is estimated at $0.52/MWh in 2004 $US (Dewees 2008, Table 3 .). Natural gas generation emits CO2 at the rate of about ½ tonne/MWh, which would add $12.50 or $25/MWh at CO2 prices of $25 and $50 respectively. Displacing gas generation could therefore be valued at $13 to $25.50/MWh displaced, dependent almost entirely on the greenhouse gas emissions.
We will use a low value of $20/MWh to represent displacement of natural gas generation and a high value of $80/MWh to represent displacement of coal generation. Each $10/MWh equals 1 cent/kWh, so these represent 2 cents and 8 cents/kWh, respectively. In our building, savings of 202,549 kWh per year would give rise to environmental benefits valued at $4,050 or $16,200, respectively. 
